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FACE VEIL BANS IN THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Eva Brems 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
European societies’ recent struggle with the integration of 
their Muslim minorities has resulted in many challenging legal 
debates, particularly with regard to the accommodation of 
religion in the workplace and in educational settings. Recently, 
such debates have extended to the proper role of religious 
expression in the public space. The most widespread example of 
this new phenomenon is the criminalization of the wearing of the 
niqab, or Islamic face veil, in public.  
One of the most remarkable aspects pertaining to the 
European bans on face coverings and the surrounding debates is 
that they proceed on the basis of assumptions about women 
wearing face veils without any factual support. At the time the 
bans in Belgium and France were adopted, there was no empirical 
research available that documented the experiences and motives 
of the women who wore face veils. Nor was there any effort 
undertaken to consult those women in the process leading up to 
the ban.  
One such example is the report by the Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry in France before the ban on face veils was 
adopted.1 The Commission of Inquiry consisted of 32 members 
                                                          
* Eva Brems is a Professor of Human Rights Law at Ghent University, 
Belgium, and was a member of the Belgian Federal Parliament (June 2010–
May 2014). The research for this paper was possible thanks to the European 
Research Council (Starting Grant). 
1 A. GÉRIN, ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE N° 2262, RAPPORT D’INFORMATION 
FAIT EN APPLICATION DE L’ARTICLE 145 DU RÈGLEMENT AU NOM DE LA 
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representing all parliamentary groups. It heard about 200 
witnesses and experts and sent out questionnaires to several 
French Embassies. After six months, it produced a 658-page 
report.2 However, the commission had not planned to hear a 
single woman who actually wore a face veil.3 The only person 
whom they did interview who wore a face veil, Kenza Drider, 
was only heard upon her own request. In the Belgian parliament, 
a large majority of legislators rejected a request for expert 
hearings as well as a referral of the bill for advice to the Council 
of State,4 the state body that controls amongst others the 
conformity of proposed new legislation with higher law, such as 
constitutional and European human rights provisions. Today, 
however, such qualitative research on the experiences of women 
who wear the face veil exists. Specifically it has been conducted 
in France and Belgium, as well as in the Netherlands,5 the United 
Kingdom,6 and Denmark.7 It is worth noting that the findings of 
these studies are very similar. While the data on which this paper 
relies are mostly from my own study in Belgium,8  it needs to be 
                                                          
MISSION D’INFORMATION SUR LA PRATIQUE DU PORT DU VOILE INTÉGRAL SUR 
LE TERRITOIRE NATIONAL (2010). 
2 Id. 
3  Id. 
4 See Parliament of Belgium, Commission Report 53/219 Nr 4, Sess. 
2010–11. 
5 See ANNELIES MOORS, AMSTERDAM SCH. FOR SOC. SCI., 
GEZICHTSSLUIERS: DRAAGSTERS EN DEBATTEN (2009), available at 
http://www.manavzw.be/_files/niqaabrapport%2010%20juli%202009%20-
%20Annelies%20Moors.pdf; see also Annelies Moors, Face-Veiling in the 
Netherlands: Public Debates and Women’s Narratives, in THE EXPERIENCES 
OF FACE VEIL WEARERS (Eva Brems ed., forthcoming 2014). 
6 See Naima Bouteldja, “France vs. England,” in THE EXPERIENCES OF 
FACE VEIL WEARERS, supra note 5. 
7 UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, RAPPORT OM BRUGEN AF NIQAB OG BURKA 
(2009), available at http://www.e-pages.dk/ku/322/. See also Kate Østergaard 
et al., Niqabis in Denmark: When Politicians ask for a Qualitative and 
Quantitative Profiling of a Very Small and Elusive Sub-Culture, in THE 
EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL WEARERS, supra note 5. 
8 Unless mentioned otherwise, quotes from niqabis (i.e. face veil wearers) 
are from EVA BREMS ET AL. HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE  
OF GHENT UNIVERSITY, WEARING THE FACE VEIL IN BELGIUM (2012) 
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emphasized that these findings are entirely consistent with those 
of the French study. 
A challenge to the French face veil ban is currently pending 
before the European Court of Human Rights, the case of S.A.S. 
v. France. This paper assesses what chance the applicant has of 
succeeding. It argues that a crucial factor will be the extent to 
which the European judges will be willing to base their reasoning 
on empirical findings regarding face veils in Europe, rather than 
on prevalent myths embraced by European audiences and 
policymakers. This Article will also argue that these empirical 
findings are crucial for an adequate legal analysis of the human 
rights dimension involved in face veil bans.   
First, this Article will set out the facts and context of face veil 
bans in Europe and the legal challenges surrounding them. Then, 
the Article will explain the legal criteria that will be used by the 
European Court of Human Rights when deciding on this issue. 
Next, in its central argument, this Article will discuss the possible 
outcome of S.A.S. v. France, by assessing whether the arguments 
advanced by European governments to ban face veils can pass the 
human rights test instituted by the court. This assessment will 
rely on the court’s case law, as well as on the case file of the case 
currently pending before it. It will also include the results of 
empirical research conducted among women wearing face veils in 
Europe and analyze whether the government’s claims are 
consistent with those empirical studies.   
 
I. FACE VEIL BANS IN EUROPE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
CHALLENGE 
 
Throughout (western) Europe, there is a trend to ban “face 
coverings” in public spaces, which targets women who wear the 
Islamic face veil.9 This phenomenon started with municipal bans; 
                                                          
[hereinafter BREMS ET AL., WEARING THE FACE VEIL], available at 
http://www.ugent.be/re/publiekrecht/en/research/human-
rights/faceveil.pdf/at_download/file. 
9 Formally, these bans apply to “face covering” in general. Yet, both the 
parliamentary debates and the political discourse surrounding their adoption, as 
well as the practice of their implementation, indicate that in fact these bans 
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such bans are in place today in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, 
and Spain.10 Nationwide bans were adopted in France in 201011 
                                                          
target only Islamic face veils. 
10 In Belgium, the “geographical coverage” of these local prohibitions 
appears to be the widest, with virtually all major cities and towns disposing of 
a prohibition, which is regularly enforced (and continues to be enforced 
despite the nationwide ban, presumably on account of the lighter procedure of 
administrative sanctions). See, e.g., Belgium’s Lower House of Parliament 
Bans Burqa-type Islamic Dress in Public, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/belgium-house-parliament-bans-
burqa-type-islamic-dress-public-article-1.169905. In the Netherlands, such 
local bans are quite rare. There, as the legality and constitutionality is widely 
considered controversial, they hardly seem to be enforced in practice. See, 
e.g., Ofrit Liviatan, From Abortion to Islam: The Changing Function of Law 
in Europe’s Cultural Debates, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 93, 103 (2013). In 
Italy, local bans can be found particularly in the north and northeast of the 
country. See, e.g., Evan Darwin Winet, Face Veil Bans and Anti-Mask Laws: 
State Interests and the Right to Cover the Face, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 217, 247 (2012). In Spain in 2010, a relatively small number of towns 
and cities in Catalonia (including, most notably, Barcelona), started to pass 
regulation banning face covering in municipal buildings. See, e.g., Natalie 
Orenstein, France Hardly Alone on Burqa Ban, NEWSDESK (July 21, 2010), 
http://newsdesk.org/2010/07/21/france-hardly-alone-on-burqa-ban/. 
11 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du 
visage dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 on the 
Prohibition of Concealing the Face in Public Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 
2010, p. 18344. Article 1 states: “No one may, in spaces open to the public, 
wear a garment that has the effect of hiding the face.” Exceptions apply when 
“clothing [is] prescribed or authorised by legal or regulatory provisions,” 
when the clothing “is justified by reasons of health or professional motives,” 
or when the clothing is “part of sports activities, festivities or artistic or 
traditional manifestations.” See id. art. 2, § II. Sanctions consist of fines for 
the wearer of up to 150 euros and/or participation in a citizenship course. 
Additionally, the Act penalizes anyone who forces another “through threats, 
violence, constraint, abuse of authority or power for reason of their gender” to 
wear face coverings, with a fine of 30,000 euros and one year imprisonment. 
Id. art. 4. The latter penalties can be doubled if the victim is a minor. Id. On 
October 7, 2010, the Constitutional Council upheld the constitutionality of the 
ban, with only minor reservations. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional 
Court] decision No. 210-613DC, Oct. 7, 2010 (Fr.). Most notably the Council 
determined that the ban could not be enforced in places of worship. Id. ¶ 5. 
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and in Belgium in 2011,12 and a regional ban was voted into 
effect by referendum in the Swiss canton of Ticino.13 Proposals 
for similar nationwide bans have been dismissed—at least 
temporarily—in Denmark,14 the Netherlands,15 Spain,16 the United 
                                                          
12 Loi visant à interdire le port de tout vêtement cachant totalement ou de 
manière principale le visage [Prohibition on Wearing Clothing Fully or Mostly 
Covering One’s Face] of June 1, 2011, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF BELGIUM], July 13, 2011, http://www.staatsblad.be (Belg.). It 
inserts an Article 563bis into the Belgian Criminal Code. In practical terms 
and “subject to legal provisions to the contrary,” this provision punishes 
persons “who appear in places accessible to the public with their faces covered 
or concealed, in whole or in part, in such a manner that they are not 
recognisable” with a monetary fine of fifteen to twenty-five euros (increased 
with the legal surcharge factor, i.e., multiplied by 5.5) and/or a prison 
sentence of one to seven days. Id. An exception applies when face covering is 
permitted or imposed by “labour regulations or municipal ordinances due to 
festivities.” Id. Moreover, the law continues the application of local bans 
imposing administrative sanctions. In Belgium, too, the law was unsuccessfully 
challenged before the Constitutional Court, which like the French 
Constitutional Council, made only a minor reservation for places of worship. 
Cour Constitutionelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no 145/2012,  
July 13, 2011, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BELGIUM], 
Dec. 6, 2012, http://www.grondwettelijkhof.be (Belg.). 
13 The referendum in September 2013 obtained a 65.4% majority. 
Gerhard Lob, Burka Ban Approved in Italian-Speaking Switzerland, 
SWISSINFO.CH (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.swissinfo.ch/ita/politica/ 
Il_Ticino_mette_al_bando_il_burqa_nella_costituzione.html?cid=36936130. 
The federal parliament will have to rule on the constitutionality of the rule. Id. 
14 In 2009, the Danish Minister of the Interior set up an ad hoc committee 
to study the desirability of banning face veils in public. They commissioned an 
empirical study, which showed that the number of face veil wearers in 
Denmark was very small, and that many were Danish converts. Subsequently, 
no ban was adopted. See Østergaard et al., supra note 7. 
15 The Dutch government agreements of 2007 and 2010 announced the 
introduction of a face-covering ban. Such a bill was introduced in Parliament 
in early 2012. Yet, after the fall of the cabinet, the new coalition announced in 
its agreement only a set of functional face-covering bans (in the context of 
education, health care, and public transportation, as well as for access to 
government buildings), rather than a general ban. See BRUGGEN SLAAN, 
REGEERAKKOORD (2012), available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/ 
documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2012/10/29/regeerakkoord/ 
regeerakkoord.pdf.  
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Kingdom,17  and Switzerland,18 although they  remain pending in 
Italy.19  
Judges have occasionally ruled that the application of a local 
ban on face veils violated fundamental rights.20 The French 
                                                          
 In July 2010, Spain’s lower chamber of parliament rejected a bill to ban 
the wearing of face-covering garments in public. At the regional level, the 
Catalan Parliament rejected two motions aiming to introduce a face veil ban in 
public spaces presented by the Popular Party on July 1, 2010 in the Plenary, 
and on April 5, 2011, in the Commission on Welfare and Immigration. See 
AMNESTY INT’L, CHOICE AND PREJUDICE: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MUSLIMS 
IN EUROPE 98 n.282 (2012), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/library/asset/EUR01/001/2012/en/85bd6054-5273-4765-9385-
59e58078678e/eur010012012en.pdf. 
17 A private member bill to ban face covering in public was discussed in 
Parliament in the fall of 2013. See George Eaton, Tory MP’s Ban  
the Burqa Bill Reaches Parliament, NEWSTATESMAN (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/09/tory-mps-ban-burqa-bill-
reaches-parliament. 
18 In September 2012, the Swiss Senate rejected by ninety-three to eighty-
seven votes an initiative proposed by the canton of Aargau which was aimed at 
banning full face veiling from public spaces. Burqa Ban Proposal Thrown Out 
by Parliament, SWISSINFO.CH (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.swissinfo.ch/ 
eng/swiss_news/Burka_ban_proposal_thrown_out_by_parliament.html?cid=33
611716. Proposed bans were rejected in the cantonal parliaments of Basel 
City, Bern, Schwyz, Solothurn, and Fribourg. Ticino to Vote on Burka Ban, 
SWISSINFO.CH (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss_news/ 
Ticino_to_vote_on_burka_ban.html?cid=36646320. 
19 The parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Affairs approved a 
bill on August 2, 2011 (“Divieto di Indossare gli Indumenti Denominati Burqa 
e Niqab”) that would prohibit persons from going in public wearing any 
garment covering the face, rendering it punishable with fines of 100 to 300  
euros. Legge 24 Ottobre 2011, n. 216/3, A.C. 627-A (It.), available at 
http://www.camera.it/701?leg=16&file=AC0378C.  
20 In February 2013, the Supreme Court of Spain overturned a city 
authority ban in Catalonia on the basis that it limited religious freedom, and 
that the city lacked the authority to order such a prohibition. S.T.S., Feb. 6, 
2013 (R.A.J., No. 4118/2011) (Spain). In Belgium, contradictory case law on 
the application of local bans to face veils was one of the reasons for the 
enactment of the general ban. See Politierechtbank [Pol.] [Police court], Jan. 
26, 2011, (Belg.) (on file with author); Politierechtbank [Pol.] [Police court] 
Tongeren, June 12, 2006, no. 05A79 (Belg.) (on file with author) (finding no 
such violation). In Italy, two courts found that the 1975 Public Order 
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Conseil d’Etat even advised in a report against the adoption of the 
nationwide ban since “no incontestable legal basis” could be 
provided for such a general ban. 21 Similarly, the Dutch Council 
of State advised against the adoption of a face-covering ban.22 
Such advice has been ignored. Both the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel23 and the Belgian Constitutional Court24 have 
validated the nationwide bans on face veils. Those courts held 
that such bans did not violate any fundamental rights, as protected 
in their respective constitutions and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). 
However, it is the European Court of Human Rights (“the 
court”) that will deliver the final word in this matter. As 
mentioned above, a challenge to the French face-covering ban in 
the case of S.A.S. v. France is currently pending before a Grand 
Chamber of the Court.25 A public hearing was held on November 
27, 2013,26 and the court’s judgment is expected sometime this 
                                                          
Protection Act could not be regarded as grounds for municipalities prohibiting 
face veils in public space in general. See TAR Trieste, 16 Ottobre 2006, nr. 
645; Diritto & Giustizia, n° 44, 2006, 111–13, Giurisprudenza di merito, n° 
9, 2007; Giur. it. 2007, 2423 (It.); Cons. Stato, 19 Giugno 2008,  
no. 3076, available at http://religare-database.eu/PDF/PDFwp5Italy/ 
ConsiglioBurqa2008.pdf; see also Mathias Möschel, La Burqa en Italie: d’une 
Politique Locale à une Législation Nationale, in QUAND LA BURQA PASSE À 
L’OUEST; ENJEUX ETHIQUES, POLITIQUES ET JURIDIQUES (David Koussens & 
Olivier Roy eds., 2013). 
21 CONSEIL D’ETAT, ETUDE RELATIVE AUX POSSIBILITÉS JURIDIQUES 
D’INTERDICTION DU PORT DU VOILE INTEGRAL (2010). 
22 Parliamentary document, Feb. 3, 2012, TK 33165, at nr. 2, available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33165-2.pdf; the advice of the 
Council of State, Nov. 28, 2011, TK 33165, at nr. 4, available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33165-4.pdf. In the Netherlands, 
as in Belgium and France, one of the powers of the Council of State is to give 
advice on proposed legislation, concerning its legality and in particular its 
conformity with higher law. Such advice, however, is not binding. 
23 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
24 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
25 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
26 See Saïla Ouald Chaib, S.A.S. v. France: A Short Summary of an 
Interesting Hearing, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Nov. 29, 2013), 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/11/29/s-a-s-v-france-a-short-summary-of-
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year.  
The applicant in S.A.S. v. France is a French citizen born in 
Pakistan who lives in the Paris region.27 She is a law graduate 
who completed an internship with a law firm in Birmingham, 
with whom she submitted the case before the European Court of 
Human Rights.28 She stated that, before the ban, she had been 
wearing the face veil on a regular basis since she was 18 years 
old: 
Gradually, I wore my full face veil whenever I 
passed through public areas, traveled on public 
transport or visited public buildings (generally 
three times a week) . . . . Of course, for instance, 
I would take off my veil if I needed to visit the 
doctor or keep an official appointment.29  
Since she submitted the application on the day the ban went 
into effect, at that point she had not yet been stopped by the 
police or fined for wearing her veil. However, in a witness 
statement submitted two years later, she discussed how the ban 
had negatively affected her life, stating that  
as a result of the implementation of Loi no. 2010-
1192 I now live under the threat of both state 
prosecution and public persecution. As a result of 
the implementation of Loi no. 2010-1192 I am now 
vilified and attacked on the streets of the Republic 
I live, effectively reduced to house arrest, virtually 
ostracized from public life and marginalized.30  
In that same statement she continues to provide additional 
                                                          
an-interesting-hearing/. 
27 Witness Statement of the Applicant, Annex 1 to Final Observations, ¶¶ 
1–2, S.A.S. v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App. No. 43835/11) [hereinafter 
Witness Statement of the Applicant] (on file with author). 
28 Id. ¶ 15. 
29 Id. ¶ 22–23. This is a correction to the statement in the application that 
“[t]he Applicant does not wear the niqab in public places at all times . . . .  As 
to when the Applicant chooses to wear the niqab in the public place depends 
very much on her introspective mood, spiritual feelings and whether she 
wishes to focus on religious matters.” Application ¶ 3, S.A.S. v. France, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (App. No. 43835/11). 
30 Witness Statement of the Applicant, supra note 27, ¶ 6. 
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information about the negative impact the ban has had on her 
daily life:  
criminalisation, or rather the political 
scaremongering that preceded it, has incited 
members of the public to now openly abuse and 
attack me whenever I drive wearing my veil. 
Pedestrians and other drivers routinely now spit on 
my car and shout sexual obscenities and religious 
bigotry. Consequently, I now feel like a prisoner 
in my own Republic, as I no longer feel able to 
leave my house unless it is essential. I leave the 
house less frequently as a result. I wear my veil 
with even less frequency when out in public as a 
result. Indeed, I also feel immense guilt that I am 
forced to no longer remain faithful to my core 
religious values.31  
In addition, the applicant’s fear of harassment motivated her 
request for anonymity,32 which was granted by the court. Her 
testimony is consistent with the testimony of other individuals 
who wear face veils about the impact that the ban has had on their 
daily lives.33  
However, in one respect, the applicant is not so 
representative. At the end of her witness statement, she put 
forward several “compromise proposals”:  
Firstly, I would be willing to accept restrictions 
                                                          
31 Witness Statement of the Applicant, supra note 27, ¶ 26. A car on a 
public road is not considered part of the “public space” under the French ban, 
as per an interpretative circular: Circulaire du 2 mars 2011 relative à la mise 
en œuvre de la loi n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la 
dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public, JORF n°0052 (Mar. 3, 2011), at 
4128. 
32 Application, supra note 29, ¶ 1. 
33 In particular, see OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, AFTER THE BAN: 
THE EXPERIENCES OF 35 WOMEN OF THE FULL-FACE VEIL IN FRANCE (2013) 
[hereinafter AFTER THE BAN], which was submitted as additional evidence with 
the Third Party Intervention of Open Society Justice Initiative, S.A.S. v. 
France, App. No. 43835/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed Oct. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/after-the-ban-
experience-full-face-veil-france-20140210.pdf. 
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regarding the visibility of the veil’s material, i.e. 
to wear only veils that were diaphanous “see-
through,” thus ensuring that my facial features 
remained essentially visible . . . . Secondly, I 
would be willing to accept exemptions enabling 
full face veils to be worn during the fasting periods 
and festivities of Ramadan and Eid.34  
It seems unlikely that other individuals who wear face veils in 
France or Belgium would agree with these proposals. Even 
though the willingness to compromise may be present (e.g., one 
Belgian respondent had approached her mayor with a proposal to 
avoid the color black for her face veil), these options seem to 
affect the essence of the women’s claims, and hence to go beyond 
a reasonable, compromised solution.  
As the European Court of Human Rights is situated on French 
territory, the face-covering ban prevented the applicant from 
attending the hearing in her case. The applicant’s attorney 
informed the court that the applicant would like to attend, yet 
wished for “confirmation from the court that there will be 
provision for her to wear her full face veil during the proceedings 
including but not limited to transit to and from the court.”35 The 
reply stated that the court could not guarantee that the applicant 
would be able to wear the full face veil while traveling to and 
from the court. With regard to whether the applicant could wear 
her face veil during the hearing, the deputy Grand Chamber 
registrar who signed the reply wrote that:  
the President has asked me to draw your attention 
to the fact that the applicant’s request confronts 
him with a question that is complex and sensitive, 
since it places the Court in a situation where the 
                                                          
34 Witness Statement of the Applicant, supra note 27, ¶ 33. 
35 Letter from Sanjeev Sharma, counsel at J.M. Wilson Solicitors LLP, to 
the president of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Nov. 11, 2013) (on file with author) (“If she is not permitted to cover her 
face then her anonymity status becomes redundant. She is in a quandary. She 
does not wish to find herself in the position of having broken the law by 
attending Court yet she wishes to exercise her fundamental right to be present 
at her own hearing.”). 
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answer could be seen by the parties and external 
observers as an indication of an opinion on the 
merits of the issues to be examined at the hearing. 
He invites the applicant to contemplate her request 
in the light of the foregoing and to inform him . . . 
if she wishes to maintain it.36  
As a result of this reply, the applicant did not attend. 
In this case, the court accepted third party interventions from 
the Belgian government, as well as from the Human Rights 
Centre of Ghent University,37 the NGO Liberty,38 Amnesty 
International, Open Society Justice Initiative (“Open Society”),39 
and the group Article 19.40 Among the third party interveners, 
both Open Society and the Human Rights Centre of Ghent 
University submitted empirical data in addition to legal 
arguments. In April 2011, when the French ban went into effect, 
                                                          
36 Letter from Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar, to 
Sanjeev Sharma, counsel at J.M. Wilson Solicitors LLP (Nov. 14, 2013) (on 
file with author). 
37 See Third Party Intervention of the Human Rights Center of Ghent 
University, S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed May 
15, 2013), available at http://www.ugent.be/re/publiekrecht/en/department/ 
human-rights/publications/sas.pdf/at_download/file. In response to the French 
government’s arguments attempting to undermine the credibility of both the 
French and Belgian empirical studies, see French Government Submissions in 
Response to the Third Party Interventions at 6–7, S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 
43835/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed Sept. 17, 2012), the Ghent University Human 
Rights Centre exceptionally got permission from the president of the Grand 
Chamber to submit a reaction, which was submitted on Nov. 24, 2013. 
38 Written Submissions on behalf of Liberty (Intervenor), S.A.S. v. 
France, App. No. 43835/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed May 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/about/legal/interventions/s.a.s.-v-
france-european-court-of-human-rights-2012.pdf. 
39 Written Comments of the Open Society Justice Initiative, S.A.S. v. 
France, App. No. 43835/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R.  filed July 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/sas-france-written-
comments-20130423.pdf. 
40 Third Party Intervention Submissions by Article 19, S.A.S. v. France, 
App. No. 43835/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R.  filed 2012), available at 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/THIRD_PARTY_INTERVENTION_SUB
MISSIONS_BY_ARTICLE_19.pdf. 
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Open Society published data from interviews with 32 women 
wearing the face veil in France, during which it inquired into 
their motivations and experiences.41 This report was added to 
Open Society’s written submission and was referred to 
extensively in Liberty’s submission. In addition, and specifically 
in light of S.A.S v. France, Open Society conducted a follow-up 
study, documenting the experiences of individuals who wore face 
veils after the ban.42 It received the court’s permission to add the 
report to its submission. In Belgium, the Human Rights Centre at 
Ghent University conducted similar research by interviewing 27 
women, partly before and partly after Belgian’s ban on face veils 
went into effect.43 The argumentation in the Centre’s third party 
intervention relies strongly on that data. Such data are vital to 
understanding the legal rationale behind the applicant’s case.   
 
II.  RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND LEGAL TEST 
 
The applicant in S.A.S. v. France alleges a violation of 
Articles 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14 of the ECHR.44 Relying on 
                                                          
41 See OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., UNVEILING THE TRUTH: WHY 32 MUSLIM 
WOMEN WEAR THE FULL-FACE VEIL IN FRANCE (2011), available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/a-unveiling-the-
truth-20100510_0.pdf. 
42 See AFTER THE BAN, supra note 33, which was submitted as additional 
evidence for Third Party Intervention of Open Justice Initiative in S.A.S. v. 
France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 2, 2013). 
43 See BREMS ET AL., WEARING THE FACE VEIL, supra note 8; see also 
Eva Brems et al., The Belgian “Burqa Ban” Confronted With Insider Realities, 
in THE EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL WEARERS, supra note 5. 
44 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms § 1, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 230 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
The relevant articles are as follows: 
Article 3 ECHR:  
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
. . . 
Article 8 ECHR:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.  
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 9 ECHR:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. 
Article 10 ECHR:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall 
not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Article 11 ECHR:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and to freedom of association with others, including the right 
to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these 
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are 
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Article 3, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment, the applicant contends that since it is illegal to wear a 
garment designed to conceal the face in public places, if she 
wears her face veil in public she risks incurring a criminal 
penalty, as well as suffering harassment and discrimination.45 In 
addition, under Article 8, which protects the right to privacy in 
the home and family, the applicant complains that the ban, which 
prohibits her from dressing as she chooses in public, is a 
violation of her right to respect for private life.46 The applicant 
also claims that Article 9 of the ECHR, which protects 
manifestation of religion or belief, is violated by the ban on face 
veils.  Effectively, she argues that her inability to wear the full 
veil in public places denies her the freedom to manifest her 
religion or belief.47 Additionally, she contends that the ban 
violates Article 10, the right to freedom of expression. 
Specifically, the ban prevents her from wearing in public a 
garment that expresses her faith, as well as her religious, 
                                                          
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of 
the police or of the administration of the State. 
Article 14 ECHR:  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
45  ECHR, Fifth Section, Questions for the Parties, S.A.S. v. France, 
App. No. 43835/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (undated) (on file with author). 
46 ECHR, supra note 44. Under the right to protection of private life, the 
European Court of Human Rights protects a wide range of autonomy-related 
interests, arguably including dress styles. The (former) European Commission 
of Human Rights (EComHR) has ruled, for instance, that constraints imposed 
on a person’s choice of mode of dress constitute an interference with private 
life as ensured by Article 8 of the Convention. See Kara v. United Kingdom, 
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Oct. 22, 1998). 
47 ECHR, supra note 44. 
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cultural, and personal identity.48 Furthermore, she alleges that the 
ban violates Article 11’s freedom of assembly and association, 
since if she cannot wear her veil, she cannot go into public, and 
thus cannot associate with others.49 Finally, she contends that the 
ban ignores Article 14, which prohibits discrimination based on 
gender, race, language, religion, or any other status. In 
particular, the applicant complains that the face covering ban, by 
its very nature, engenders discrimination based on sex, religion, 
and ethnic origin against women who, like her, wear the full 
veil.50 
It is important to begin with the understanding that Article 3 
is an absolute right: once a certain treatment falls under its scope, 
it is automatically a violation, regardless of its justification. The 
main legal question is therefore one of a threshold of severity: 
can the treatment that the applicant complains of be labeled 
“inhuman” or “degrading?” The idea that the risk of a criminal 
penalty—in this case a fine—could be considered degrading or 
inhuman is farfetched. Yet, the claim that the ban exposes women 
who wear a face veil to harassment raises a relevant issue. The 
applicant in S.A.S. “believes that if she wears the niqab[,] 
members of the public . . . will request her without proper 
justification to remove it and will in the process harass and 
discriminate against her thereby exposing her to degrading 
treatment.”51 The research in France and Belgium demonstrates 
that women who wear a face veil in those countries suffer serious 
harassment. This research also strongly suggests that such 
harassment has increased as a result of the bans, with many 
citizens acting as vigilante policemen.52 It may legally be possible 
                                                          
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Exposé des faits et questions aux parties ¶ 11, S.A.S. v. France, App. 
No. 43835/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed Apr. 11, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110063. 
52 BREMS ET AL., WEARING THE FACE VEIL, supra note 8, at 17–21. 
AFTER THE BAN, supra note 33, at 13, reports that the majority of interviewees 
experience verbal abuse on a regular basis, and that twelve respondents 
reported physical assaults, such as having their veil pulled off and being 
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to hold the French government accountable under Article 3 for 
not adequately protecting women who wear a face veil. Yet the 
applicant is making a different point, namely that by introducing 
the face covering ban, the French state has implicitly, if not 
explicitly, encouraged aggression against women who wear face 
veils. Accepting this line of reasoning would be innovative. 
However, since there is almost no hard evidence linking the 
aggressions directly to the adoption of the law, it is unlikely that 
the court will be persuaded by this argument. 
Under all the other ECHR provisions that are invoked in this 
case, the court instead engages in a balancing exercise between 
the right that is at stake and the interest that is invoked by the 
government as a “legitimate aim” that may justify a proportionate 
restriction of that right. It is likely that the court will discuss the 
impact of the ban under Article 9, stating that its reasoning 
applies mutatis mutandis to the claims under Articles 853 and 10.54 
The court may dismiss the claim under Article 11.55 But the court 
should address the discrimination claim under Article 14 in 
                                                          
violently pushed or spat on. It notes that “the ban and public discourse seems 
to have implicitly legitimized the abusive treatment of veiled women. With a 
widespread condemnation of the full-face veil, the women’s testimonies reveal 
that some members of the public seem to think that the law allows for or 
legitimizes private enforcement.” Id. 
53 The applicant argues applicability of Article 8 of the ECHR on multiple 
grounds: (1) the full face veil provides the person wearing it a sense of acute 
or extended privacy; (2) the matter relates to the applicant’s individual 
autonomy concerning her identity and dress code; (3) wearing the face veil is 
related to her ability to interact with others; (4) the exposure to public hostility 
infringes upon her physical and psychological integrity; and (5) the face veil is 
a cultural practice of a minority group. See Final Observations, S.A.S. v. 
France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶¶ 39–47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 4, 2013). 
54 The relevance of freedom of expression for this case was particularly 
emphasized in the submission by Article 19 before the Grand Chamber, i.e., 
after the Fifth Sections “questions to the parties,” where it was not included. 
See Third Party Intervention Submissions by Article 19, supra note 40. 
 55 In this respect, it is noteworthy that before relinquishing jurisdiction to 
the Grand Chamber, the Fifth Section of the Court sent three questions to the 
parties, pertaining to their opinion on a positive violation of Articles 8, 9, and 
14 only, the latter moreover being restricted to discrimination based on 
religion or sex. Exposé des faits et Questions aux parties, supra note 51.   
2014.05.01 BREMS.DOCX 5/11/2014  12:06 PM 
 FACE VEIL BANS IN THE ECHR 533 
combination with one or more of the other Articles of ECHR 
separately.56 This is because the face covering bans are manifest 
examples of seemingly neutral legislation that is in fact targeted at 
a specific group, namely Muslim women who wear a face veil. 
The European Court of Human Rights recognizes that “a general 
policy or measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects 
on a particular group may be considered discriminatory 
notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that group,”57 
i.e. the concept of indirect discrimination. This does not require 
proof of discriminatory intent even though in these cases this 
proof would not be hard to find.  
It is clear that “the legislative history of the law demonstrates 
that the intent was to regulate the burqa and niqab, which were 
specifically identified as the target of the ban.”58 The effective 
move towards a general ban on face covering in France began not 
long after MP André Gérin, along with others, filed a resolution 
on June 9, 2009 aimed at establishing a commission of inquiry 
concerning the face veil on French territory.59 Not long 
afterwards, President Nicolas Sarkozy, in a speech on June 22, 
2009, stated that such veils were not welcome in France and that 
legislation was necessary “to protect women from being forced to 
cover their faces and to uphold France’s secular values.”60 That 
the ban is aimed at the face veil, despite its neutral language, is 
furthermore obvious on account of the constant references to the 
                                                          
56 Article 14 of ECHR prohibits discrimination in the exercise of any of 
the Convention rights, and hence has to be invoked together with another 
ECHR provision. See ECHR, supra note 44. 
57 D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, 2007-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., 
para. 175, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83256 
ECtHR. 
58 Written Comments of the Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 39, 
¶ 6. 
59 Willy Fautré, Is the Burqa Compatible with Women’s Rights? The 
“Burqa issue” in the EU, Paper Presented at the Burqa and Women’s Rights 
Conference at the European Parliament in Brussels (June 10, 2010), available 
at http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=5170. 
60 Cécilia Gabizon, Sarkozy: “La Burqa n’est pas la Bienvenue,” LE 
FIGARO (June 25, 2009), http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2009/06/23/01002-
20090623ARTFIG00055-sarkozy-la-burqa-n-est-pas-la-bienvenue-.php. 
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face veil throughout the parliamentary debates. Moreover, the 
opinion requested by the Prime Minister from the Conseil d’Etat 
in the early drafting stages concerned the “legal grounds for a 
ban on the full veil.”61 Clearly the ban was not about the visibility 
of faces in general, but specifically about the Islamic face veil. In 
that sense, the applicant is right to state that “this is a case where 
the discriminatory treatment comes very close to direct 
discrimination,”62 on grounds (e.g., sex,63 religion64) for which 
the court exercises strict scrutiny.  
Regardless, once the applicant has demonstrated that there is a 
difference in treatment or a disproportionate prejudicial effect, 
the burden shifts to the government to prove that the difference in 
treatment pursued a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner. At 
that point the review of any claim for discrimination would be 
examined under a similar analysis as that used for Articles 8, 9, 
10, or 11 of the ECHR. Under this analysis, an interference with 
a right can only be justified if it has a legal basis, pursues a 
legitimate aim from among those listed in the restriction clause,65 
and—most importantly—if there is a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the restrictive measure and that aim. 
Hence, whether the court conducts its analysis of the ban under 
the prohibition of discrimination or religious freedom, or both, 
the focus of the court’s reasoning will be on the examination of 
                                                          
61 CONSEIL D’ETAT, SECTION DU RAPPORT ET DES ETUDES, supra note 21, 
at 7 (emphasis added). 
62 Final Observations, supra note 53, ¶ 141. 
63 Stec v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 65731/01 & 65900/01, 2006-VI 
Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 52, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? 
i=001-73198. 
64 Hoffmann v. Austria, App. No. 12875/87, 1993 Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 
36, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57825. 
65 Several provisions of the ECHR are drafted in such a way (similar to 
other conventions such as the ICCPR), that the first paragraph sets out the 
scope of the right, whereas the second paragraph contains the conditions for its 
legitimate restriction. These restriction clauses set out three conditions: the 
restrictive measure should have a legal basis; it needs a legitimate aim from 
among those listed in the restriction clause; and it has to be “necessary in a 
democratic society,” i.e., proportionate with respect to the realization of that 
aim. 
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whether the ban can be considered proportionate to one or several 
legitimate aims.  
According to the French Government in S.A.S., the 
“legitimate aim” underlying the face covering ban, involves three 
policy goals: (1) the protection of public safety; (2) respect for 
“compliance with the minimal requirements of life in society”; 
and (3) “equality between men and women and respect for the 
dignity of the person.”66 
 
III. UNCOVERING IN THE NAME OF “THE MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS 
OF LIFE IN SOCIETY?” 
 
“Public safety” is explicitly mentioned in Article 9(2) as a 
legitimate aim that may justify proportionate restrictions of 
religious freedom.67 Additionally, the protection of equality 
between men and women and of human dignity could also be a 
legitimate aim under Article 9 due to language regarding “the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”68 Yet, it is not 
clear that respect for “the minimal requirements of life in 
society” fits under any of the “legitimate aims” under Article 9.69 
The French Council of State was the first to suggest that this idea 
of “minimal requirements of life in society” could be legally 
translated into a novel interpretation of the concept of “public 
order,” building on the idea of “non-material public order.”70 
The Council of State noted that such a concept had not been 
developed in French legal doctrine or case law, and was not 
found in any neighbouring legal system either. Hence, the 
                                                          
66 French Government Submissions, S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 
43835/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed July 31, 2013), supra note 37, para. 94. 
67 See ECHR, supra note 44. 
68 Id. 
69  Id. 
70 CONSEIL D’ETAT, SECTION DU RAPPORT ET DES ETUDES, supra note 21, 
at 26–27. On the concept of non-material public order in this context, see Rim-
Sarah Alouane, Bas les Masques! Unveiling Muslim Women on Behalf of the 
Protection of Public Order: Reflections on the Legal Controversies Around a 
Novel Definition of “Public Order” Used to Ban Full-Face Covering in 
France, in THE EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL WEARERS, supra note 5. 
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Council of State considered the concept of non-material public 
order vulnerable to constitutional challenges and advised against 
its use. However, French MPs borrowed the new concept, also 
naming it “social public order,” and built their case for a ban on 
face coverings largely on that ground. It is, however, far from 
certain whether the court will agree with this line of reasoning. 
At the public hearing, one of the judges asked the representative 
of the French government how she viewed the policy goal of 
“minimal requirements of life in society” coexisting with the list 
of legitimate aims in the second paragraph of Article 9 of the 
ECHR. The representative’s answer referred to “the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.”71 This answer, however, 
supposes the existence of a right to see the face of others in a 
public space. This is certainly not a legal right.  
In the French debates surrounding the face-covering ban, 
seeing the face of others has been put forward as a moral right. 
This view is based on the work of the French sociologist 
Elisabeth Badinter, who was interviewed by the parliamentary 
commission of inquiry,72 and of the French philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas. The latter’s discourse about the “face of the 
other,” as the basis for meeting another person and being morally 
involved,73 was interpreted literally (as referring to the actual face 
of a human being as the crucial building stone for moral relations 
in a society, rather than the presence of the other in our midst) by 
the Commission of Inquiry,74 and by the French government in its 
arguments in S.A.S. v. France.75 However, the applicant rightly 
                                                          
71 This quote was taken from notes the author took during oral hearing of 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in S.A.S. v. 
France in Strasbourg, France, on November 27, 2013. 
72 GÉRIN, supra note 1, at 118. 
73 See FACE OF THE OTHER AND THE TRACE OF GOD: ESSAYS ON THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS (Jeffrey Bloechl, ed., 2000); RICHARD 
A. COHEN, FACE TO FACE WITH LEVINAS (1986).   
74
 GÉRIN, supra note 1, at 117–18. 
75 French Government Submissions, supra  note 37, ¶ 104. In addition, 
the Belgian government, as well as the French government in its oral 
arguments, referred to the Belgian philosopher Guy Haarscher. See Third 
Party Intervention of the Belgian Government at 4, S.A.S. v. France (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. filed Sept. 18, 2013). 
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alleges that  
the government is treading on dangerous ground 
when it attempts to justify a legal measure by 
postmodern philosophy, which by its very nature is 
highly complex and not capable of clear-cut 
interpretations, let alone one “correct” 
interpretation. Arguably, the law prohibiting 
covering the face in public is not at all in line with 
the spirit of Levinas’ philosophy as his idea of 
“face-to-face encounter” is centred on inherent 
respect for the other—the opposite of what the law 
in question achieves.76  
The level of subjectivity and cultural bias inherent in the 
“minimal requirements of life in society” argument becomes even 
more apparent in the submissions by the Belgian government, 
which advance the fact that it is considered respectful to take off 
sunglasses during conversation, and states without any reference 
to authority that appearing on the street implies a readiness to be 
looked at that is an inherent limit to the right to isolation.77 This 
                                                          
76 Final Observations, supra note 53, ¶ 90. It is added, moreover, that 
[e]ven if one accepts a literalist interpretation of Levinas that 
it is crucial actually to see the other’s face for an ethical 
obligation towards her to arise, it is still absurd to conclude 
that that leads to the compulsory uncovering of the face, so 
that such an obligation towards the legally sanctioned person 
can be created. In other words, even if one accepts the idea 
that the face has special importance in the western tradition, 
it is a far cry to enforce uncovering the face by penal 
sanctions. If the Respondent followed its own logic through, 
it ought also to introduce a law making touching the other in 
the public space compulsory, as skin contact is also a feature 
of Levinasian discourse. The absurdity of the Respondent’s 
argument is evident and fails to take into account the cultural 
practices of minorities which does not necessarily subscribe 
to this philosophical ideology. 
Id. 
77 Third Party Intervention of the Belgian Government, supra note 75, at 
6. 
A parallel can be drawn: it is today still generally considered 
more respectful toward others to take off one’s sunglasses in 
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view results from translating the philosophical rhetoric into 
concrete behavioral requirements. The idea being that people who 
choose to be in public are not allowed to make themselves 
unavailable for interaction with others or to give such an 
impression. It also assumes that not showing one’s face should 
automatically be considered as a signal of withdrawal from, or 
unavailability for, social interaction.78 Yet, even if one accepts 
furthering social interaction as a “legitimate aim” that may justify 
restrictions of fundamental rights as a matter of principle, it 
appears difficult to justify the necessity of a face-covering ban in 
all public spaces to further this aim. 
First, it is important to consider if wearing a face veil really 
prevents communication. In an age of mobile phones and online 
communities, the philosophical claim that someone cannot meet 
                                                          
conversation so as to allow real and complete interaction. So 
many emotions pass through our face and specifically 
through our eyes. The eyes even promote listening. Trying to 
interact with respect for others without the classical rituals of 
greeting and looking (“les rituels classiques du bonjour et du 
regard”), is not well preparing the field of the relation. The 
right to isolation has its limits. I can go out on the street and 
not feel like engaging in a long conversation, but I have be 
ready to be watched and, ideally, greeted, even by someone 
who is a stranger to me. The notion of dignity in dressing 
and social contacts is relatively subjective yet the more a 
society is multicultural and the more types of religious and 
philosophical convictions and types of cultural customs 
coexist, the more persons have to be careful to not show 
them in a too demonstrative manner on the public street. The 
vestimentary codes in our societies are the product of a 
societal consensus, they are the fruit of a balanced 
compromise between our individual liberty and our codes of 
interaction in society. 
Id. (translated by author from French). 
78 Compare with the argument of the Belgian government that “[p]ersons 
who wear a garment that hides their face completely or mostly send a signal to 
the majority of those [women] who pass them that they do not want to 
participate in society in an active manner.” Id. (translated from French by the 
author). Note that the way this argument is framed admits that this is a 
judgment faced by those who are confronted with face veil-wearers, and it is 
not even claimed that this is the intention of the face veil-wearers themselves. 
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someone else without looking him or her in the face seems 
detached from reality. Several women interviewed expressed a 
self-image that included them as open or sociable persons. Many 
of the women stated that, from their perspective, communication 
is perfectly possible, even if they recognize that the veil could be 
experienced as a communicative barrier by those they speak to. 
Within their familiar environment, especially before the ban, 
women who wear a face veil participated in a range of social 
activities involving contact with others at schools, in shops, and 
administrative offices among others.  
For example, one interviewee described her experience as 
follows, “Me, I talk to everybody, everybody sees me laugh; 
they answer me in the same tone if they want to. When they don’t 
want to, that’s another matter.”79 
Another interviewee also shared the following recollection. 
At the time I lived in a neighborhood of old 
people . . . . And these people recognized me 
without any problem and they acted toward me as 
if they saw whoever else in the street . . . . We 
were good neighbors, and I remember that when 
we moved, the old people were even sad because 
they told us: “Oh, we knew you so well and we 
knew that we could count on you, that we could 
ask you something.” There was even an old lady, 
who lived upstairs where I lived, and whose 
children did not visit her. And she told me, “it is 
so good of you, that you come and visit the 
elderly,” because I visited her from time to time 
with my children. So it does not stand in the way 
of anything at all. It is enough to want to accept 
the difference and to understand that behind that 
face veil, there is a person who is completely 
normal.80 
Similarly, the applicant in S.A.S. v. France states:  
                                                          
79 Interviews by Eva Brems et al. with Belgian niqabis, at nr 4 
[hereinafter Interviews with Belgian niqabis] (on file with author). 
80 Id. at nr 25. 
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The most important thing about how I 
communicate [is] my words and how I follow them 
up with deeds—not the visibility of my face. My 
veil compels others to respond to my brains, not 
my body; to respond to what I say, not how I look 
when I say it; on my character, not my clothes.81 
Moreover, many interviewees reported positive contacts when 
they interacted with people who they had previously been 
unacquainted with. Several women told stories of how a 
conversation with an initially suspicious stranger turned into a 
positive exchange. For example, 
In a supermarket, people told me “madam, why do 
you wear that?” I came closer to a gentleman and 
told him what the religion says. It is not mandatory 
but if you do it on your own initiative . . . . He 
told me “maybe your husband forced you.” I said 
“you see, I do my shopping all alone, and I drive 
alone, there is nobody with me.” And he was 
satisfied.82 
The empirical findings thus reveal the erroneous character of 
one of the main assumptions legislators had for banning the face 
veil, namely that the face veil indicates a withdrawal from social 
interaction. At least before the ban, women wearing a face veil 
were in fact interacting in numerous ordinary ways with society 
at large. Moreover, it appears that the ban has not increased these 
women’s social interactions. In fact, the ban may have decreased 
these women’s social interactions. Many women who choose to 
wear a face veil are strongly attached to it and continue to wear it 
despite the ban, meaning that they now avoid going into public 
except by car. These women are afraid of an encounter with the 
police as well as of the harassment and aggression by strangers. 
Hence, instead of increased social interaction, the effect of the 
ban on these women is a deterioration of their social life, their 
interactions with society at large, and their mobility.  
Women report that the ban has led to women who wear face 
                                                          
81 Witness Statement of the Applicant, supra note 27, ¶ 20. 
82 Interviews with Belgian niqabis, supra note 79, at nr 2. 
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veils being harassed even more than before, severely limiting 
their ability to interact with society. A French face veil wearer 
reports a typical incident of harassment: 
Last time I went to Auchan (supermarket EB), a 
mob formed around me and people were saying 
“what are you doing here? It’s forbidden! You 
have no right to go out entirely veiled. It’s banned, 
it’s illegal. Go back to your country.” [I] feel like 
a monster. Even pedophiles and criminals, are not 
treated like that . . . . We are seen as less than 
nothing, not as human beings.83 
Another woman reports the negative effects of the ban on her 
life as a mother, “I don’t go out at all with my son. At two and a 
half he’s at the age to go to the park, to play outside. It’s not 
something I can do with him because I’m scared.”84 
Even if some women did take off the face veil as a result of 
the ban,85 and it did result in their being more easily approached 
by others in the public sphere,86 the ban is a disproportionate 
measure to achieve that effect. The research suggests that the ban 
is a disproportionate measure to achieve that effect. In practice, 
women can and do communicate with their faces veiled. As the 
above interviews have shown, women who wear a face veil do 
experience positive exchanges. Social integration is a matter of 
goodwill on both sides and is likely to be better realized by 
inclusive means rather than ones that are repressive. 
 
  
                                                          
83 AFTER THE BAN, supra note 33, at 15. 
84 Id. at 12. 
85 Among the thirty-five women interviewed in France after the ban, eight 
respondents have removed their full-face veil, while twenty-seven continue to 
wear it despite the ban. See id. at 2. 
86 It should be noted, however, that the aggression of the public at large 
appears to extend to women who dress in a conservative, Islamic manner, even 
without a face veil. Hence, it is far from certain that those same women, when 
they take off the face veil yet otherwise keep dressing as they did before, 
would be more easily approached by members of the public. 
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IV. BANNING IN THE NAME OF SAFETY? 
 
In the public discussion surrounding face-covering bans, the 
safety argument often concerns subjective feelings of danger that 
are generated by the sight of a woman who covers her face. In 
the Belgian Parliament, for instance, the introduction of a face 
veil ban was compared to placing street lamps in a dark alley in 
order to reduce the fear of crime and provide a feeling of public 
security.87 In our interviews, veiled women recounted experiences 
of engendering feelings of unease or fear in others. One woman 
stated, “I understand completely that people are scared. It’s 
normal, because it’s covered, it’s hidden, you don’t know what’s 
underneath. At first sight, it’s shocking.” At the same time, these 
women’s stories also show that it is possible to overcome these 
feelings and to establish meaningful contacts and relationships 
with others. These contacts and relationships appear to exist in 
particular with persons with whom there is regular interaction and 
who may therefore be assumed to be “used to” the veil. 
Examples include neighbors, teachers, and shopkeepers. Thus, 
any feelings of danger do not necessarily accompany contact with 
veiled women, and as such those feelings can be overcome, it is 
an issue that might be better addressed by other means than those 
that are repressive. 
Moreover, in the European Court of Human Rights, a feeling 
of danger can only serve as a ground for the restriction of human 
rights if there is an objective foundation for such a feeling. 
Therefore, a religious practice cannot be prohibited merely on 
account of the fact that a part of the population finds it offensive 
or even alarming. The court has made this particularly clear in its 
case law, holding that “a legal system which applies restrictions 
on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of public feeling—
real or imaginary—cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing 
social needs recognised in a democratic society, since that society 
must remain reasonable in its judgement.”88 Following this line of 
                                                          
87 Parliament of Belgium, Hand. Kamer 2009–10, April 29, 2010, nr. 52-
151, 23, available at http://www.dekamer.be/doc/PCRI/pdf/52/ip151.pdf. 
88 Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 57, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-87404. 
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reasoning, the argument of subjective safety, in this case with 
regard to face veils, cannot serve as a justification for restricting 
human rights. 
By contrast, the promotion of objective public safety can be 
regarded as a legitimate government objective. Yet, any measure 
must still address an actual safety concern. Restriction of civil 
liberties—here, the right to freedom of religion and expression— 
cannot be based on speculation alone. One example of this is in 
Arslan v. Turkey, where members of a religious order were 
criminally convicted for wearing distinctive religious clothing in 
public. The court held that the convictions violated their freedom 
of religion since there was no evidence that the applicants 
represented a threat to public order, or that they were involved in 
proselytism.89  
Even if the ban on face veils did promote public safety, it 
would still be difficult to reconcile the ban’s broad scope—all 
public spaces—with the proportionality principle. That principle 
requires that a measure restricting a fundamental freedom must 
not burden that freedom any more than necessary to achieve its 
purpose.90 In most cases, safety risks can be overcome by 
measures less restrictive than a ban, such as the obligation to lift 
the face veil upon a legitimate request. Public safety only requires 
the ability to identify someone when needed rather than 
permanent recognizability. Among our interviewees, we found 
that women were in general willing to identify themselves to 
police or other authorities by lowering their veils. Many 
interviewees explicitly stated that they would be willing to 
identify themselves to male as well as female officials. The 
applicant in S.A.S. v. France is no exception. In her application 
to the court, she confirmed her willingness “to show her face 
when a security check is required” as well as “to lift her veil 
when requested to do so for necessary identity checks.”91 Hence, 
                                                          
89 Arslan v. Turkey, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 50, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97380. 
90 See supra note 52–55 and accompanying text for an explanation of the 
test applied by the European Court of Human Rights. 
91 Application, supra note 29, ¶ 4. See also Witness Statement of 
Applicant, supra note 27, ¶ 30 (“Of course, I accept that—at specific times, 
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the risk that the face veil poses for objective safety in the general 
public sphere appears exaggerated, if not unfounded. This 
provides support that the ban is too broad and disproportionate to 
be justified as a safety measure. 
 
V.  BANNING FACE VEILS IN THE NAME OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS? 
 
During the parliamentary debates concerning the French and 
Belgian legal bans the discourse emphasizing women’s rights and 
women’s dignity was abundant. Strong language was used, 
branding the face veil as a “mobile jail,” a “textile prison,” or 
the “shroud of freedom.”92 The underlying assumption of this 
argument is that women wearing a face veil are (mostly or 
always) forced to do so. In its submission in S.A.S. v. France, 
the French government stated that  
to consider that women, for the sole reason that 
they are women, must hide their faces in public 
space, is to deny them the right to exist as 
individuals in this space and to reserve the 
expression of their individuality to the private 
family space, since only the men of the family 
have the right to see their face, or to an exclusively 
female space. Only men, according to such a view, 
are entitled to such public individual existence. 
Hence there is an absolute, publicly asserted, 
negation of equality between men and women.93 
Yet, all available empirical research demonstrates that this 
central assumption is erroneous. While the research does not 
                                                          
locations, contexts—legitimate public safety issues do require those wearing 
full face veils to satisfy security identity checks. At an airport or bank, for 
instance, or during heightened localized security threats, I accept that security 
identity checks (i.e., lifting my veil to reveal my face) are entirely justified and 
reasonable.”). 
92 Belgian Parliamentary Documents, Parl. St. Kamer 2010-11, nr. 53-
219/4, 5, 9, 13, 14 & 21, available at http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/ 
53/0219/53K0219004.pdf. 
93 French Government Observations in Reply to Application ¶¶ 86–88, 
S.A.S. v. France (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 29, 2012) (translated by the author from 
French). 
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allow a conclusion as toward whether or not (and if so, how 
many) women are being forced to wear a face veil,94 it does 
clearly show that for a significant number of women who wear a 
face veil, the face veil is the result of an autonomous choice.95 All 
interviewees describe the decision to start wearing the face veil as 
a well-considered and free decision, a personal trajectory of 
deepening and perfecting one’s faith. One woman describes her 
trajectory this way: “I wore my veil first on the inside before I 
wore it on the outside. For me, the veil on the inside is the first 
thing. My veil is my chastity, it is my behavior, it is my 
politeness, it is my respect.”96 
Another woman expresses how she sees herself and others 
who decide to wear a face veil: “A woman who is completely 
veiled, for me she is a woman with strength, with enormous self-
confidence . . . . You need it very much.”97 
In France and Belgium, nearly all women who choose to wear 
a veil were confronted with strong negative reactions from their 
relatives and friends, sometimes even their husbands. There is no 
evidence, in either France or Belgium, of pressure from husbands 
or relatives to wear a face veil; while there is recorded pressure 
from husbands and relatives to not wear a face veil. 
By contrast, forcing a woman to wear a burqa or niqab 
amounts to an impermissible oppression of women, a type of 
domestic violence. It is doubtful whether criminalizing and fining 
the women in question can be considered a relevant measure to 
                                                          
94 In its submissions in S.A.S. v. France, the French government refers to 
the testimony of Sihem Habchi, chair of the organization Ni Putes Ni 
Soumises, who describes the testimony of a woman named Karima about the 
domestic violence she suffered from her husband, including her being forced 
to wear a face veil. See French Government Submissions in Response to the 
Third Party Interventions at 7, supra note 37. This is the only concrete 
example in the debates that we found. In the Belgian study, explicit efforts 
were undertaken to identify similar cases, yet none were found. See BREMS ET 
AL., WEARING THE FACE VEIL, supra note 8. 
95 See THE EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL WEARERS, supra note 5, for 
reports on empirical research from Belgium, the Netherlands, France, the 
United Kingdom, and Denmark. 
96 Focus group discussion with Belgian niqabis (on file with author). 
97 Interviews with Belgian niqabis, supra note 79, at nr. 19. 
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combat this oppression. This approach treats the oppressed 
woman as a perpetrator rather than as a victim.98 Hence, the idea 
of protecting women against the imposition of a face veil cannot 
justify a face-covering ban under Article 9 of the ECHR.  
Overall, a woman’s agency appears as a strong and 
determining factor in her journey toward the face veil. These 
women generally see themselves, and each other, as “strong” 
women.99 They experience the ban as a denial of their autonomy 
and hence as anti-emancipatory. The applicant in S.A.S. v. 
France stated this view eloquently:  
To be clear, neither my faith nor any man is 
dictating to me what I can wear in public: only the 
State is dictating that to me. Neither my faith nor 
any man is restricting my liberty to choose my 
own clothing: only the State is restricting that 
liberty. Neither my faith nor any man is 
compelling me to obey clothing restrictions under 
specific threat of punishment: only the State would 
punish me if I failed to comply with its clothing 
restrictions.100  
It should be noted that the court has ruled that personal 
autonomy “can also include the possibility of devoting oneself to 
activities perceived as being of a nature physically or morally 
damageable or dangerous to oneself,” and that “particularly 
serious reasons” are required for state interference.101 Hence, to 
                                                          
98 While the Belgian ban only criminalizes the person who covers her 
face, the French law creates a separate offense for forcing another to cover her 
face. Yet, that provision does not appear to be applied in practice. One year 
after the ban was implemented, the French Ministry of Interior reported that 
299 women had received a fine or warning wearing the full-face veil, yet there 
was no mention of any application to men. See Written Comments of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative, supra note 39, ¶ 12. Moreover, there is no evidence 
(nor even any claim in that sense by the French government in S.A.S.) that 
such warnings or fines are used to help women who might be victims of abuse. 
99 See also Witness Statement of the Applicant, supra note 27, ¶ 15 (“I am 
a strong, independent Muslim woman.”). 
100 Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis added). 
101 K.A. & A.D. v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 17, 2005), para. 83. 
See also Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002 Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 66, 
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the extent that the face veil is chosen freely, a ban based on the 
protection of women’s autonomy does not make sense. Moreover, 
research completed after the French ban went into effect shows 
that the ban has made women more dependent on their husbands 
because they go out less, either to avoid a fine because they cover 
their faces or, if they stopped using a face veil, because they feel 
uncomfortable.102The French government rejects the relevance of 
free choice in this debate, stating that the face veil “effaces 
persons from public space,” and that “regardless [of] whether this 
effacement is desired or suffered, it is necessarily dehumanizing 
and can therefore hardly be regarded as consistent with human 
dignity.”103 The government also suggests those women who wear 
a face veil suffer false consciousness,104 having internalized an 
oppressive rule.105 The French government’s former claim, as the 
S.A.S. v. France applicant discusses, is “an abstract assumption 
based on stereotyping and chauvinistic logic that does not survive 
scrutiny.”106 Their latter claim is “deeply paternalistic and 
selective as it assumes that non-Muslim French women are not 
subjected to cultural influences in their personal choices.”107  
However, the focus on women’s autonomy is not all there is 
to say about the face veil from a gender or feminist perspective.108 
                                                          
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60448. 
102 AFTER THE BAN, supra note 33, at 8. 
103 French Government Observations in Reply to Application, supra note 
93, ¶ 92 (translated by the author from French). 
104 The term “false consciousness” denotes the inability of members of 
subordinated groups to recognize their subordination, on account of their 
interiorization of the views and values that support this subordination. 
105 Id. ¶ 105. 
106 Final Observations, supra note 53, ¶ 95. 
107 S.A.S Response to the French Government’s Submissions ¶ 30, in 
S.A.S. v. France (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed on May 29, 2012) (“Western ideas of 
feminine sexuality and fashion are assumed to be unproblematic for gender 
equality, despite the feminist tradition that has long challenged such ideas as 
oppressive. The law banning face covering purports to promote gender 
equality, but does so in an ill-informed and discriminatory way.”). 
108 See Dolores Morondo Taramundi, Women’s Oppression and Face Veil 
Bans: A Feminist Assessment, in THE EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL WEARERS, 
supra note 5. 
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From a more radical feminist angle, a practice that makes 
women—yet not men cover up—whether voluntarily or not, is an 
expression of male dominance.109 Yet this is just one of many 
“cultural” expressions of patriarchy. In the same sphere, 
mainstream French and Belgian culture makes women—yet not 
men—go to great lengths to be pretty. Applying make-up, 
shaving armpits and legs, and wearing uncomfortably high heels 
are just some of the expressions of French and Belgian women’s 
submission to patriarchy. Eradicating all such expressions is a 
valuable feminist project,110 but this is manifestly not the French 
or Belgian government’s project. If it were, it would be difficult 
to justify an exclusive focus on face veils111 while other equally 
patriarchal practices, that are immensely more widespread, 
remain unchallenged. Hence, this line of reasoning cannot justify 
the ban under the auspice of the protection of women’s rights. 
In addition, a close reading of the parliamentary debates 
surrounding face veil bans reveals that the women’s rights 
argument is not necessarily focused on the rights of women who 
wear face veils. Instead, the argument is that the rights of all 
women would be offended by the use of the face veil. The French 
government in S.A.S. v. France states, “[t]he entire concealing 
of the face also affects the dignity of the persons who share the 
public space with the fully veiled person and who are treated as 
person from whom one has to protect oneself by refusing all 
exchange, including visual exchange.”112 In legal terms, the 
question becomes, whether the face veil can be banned as a 
symbol of women’s oppression or lack of respect for human 
                                                          
109 Taramundi defines a radical feminist perspective as “a form of critical 
theory originating in the second-wave, whose interest lies mainly with social 
power structures, and in particular, with patriarchy or sex-gender systems.” 
Id. at 1 n.1. 
110 Yet, it might be doubted if criminal law is an appropriate way to 
realize such a project. 
111 It is estimated that around 1,900 women wear the face veil in France; 
in Belgium, between 200 and 270 women. See GÉRIN, supra note 1, at 29, 74. 
This is less than 0.5% of the Muslim minority in these countries. 
112 French Government Observations in Reply to Application, supra note 
93, ¶ 93. 
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dignity. Prohibiting symbols is virtually always at odds with 
freedom of speech. In Vajnai v. Hungary,113 the European Court 
of Human Rights ruled that the application of the Hungarian ban 
on communist symbols to someone wearing a red star during a 
demonstration violated Article 10 of the ECHR. The court was 
mindful of the fact that for many Hungarians, communist symbols 
are associated with painful memories114  but stated, however, that 
the symbol did not exclusively represent totalitarian rule,115 nor 
had the Hungarian government shown that the use of the star had 
generated any danger of violence or disorder, or that there was a 
“pressing social need” for the interference with free speech.116 To 
the extent that the face veil can be analyzed as a symbol, the 
same reasoning should apply and thus any ban should be struck 
down.  
Moreover, the empirical findings reveal another major 
problem with this line of reasoning—namely that such an analysis 
involves a strictly outsider interpretation of the face veil as a 
symbol carrying a message. However, as the interviews with 
women who wear a face veil show, those women do not intend to 
reject the outside world or to send any message. While most 
interpretations consider the face veil as a message to the world 
saying that “women should cover themselves,” or even that 
“women should be submitted to men,” the women themselves do 
not see it that way. Yet, those women who wear a face veil are 
well aware of these interpretations, and find them a source of 
major frustration. One woman stated: “It’s really, really 
humiliating and degrading for the personality of a Muslim girl, to 
hear someone say morning and evening ‘it’s the men who submit 
you, it’s the men who oblige you . . . .’”117 Another interviewee 
reported, “That is really something I want for myself. For 
me.”118 
                                                          
113 Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 57, http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-87404. 
114 Id. at para. 55. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Interviews with Belgian niqabis, supra note 79, at nr. 21. 
118 Id. at nr. 11. 
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For these women, the veil is not a message to the outside 
world. It is a very personal thing—a choice they make for 
themselves concerning their relationship to God. Proselytizing is 
far from these women’s minds. If there is a message, it is 
certainly not a normative one, in that it is not about telling others 
how to behave. Nor is it a message about gender relations, but 
instead about religion. If the face veil is a symbol at all, for the 
women wearing the face veil it is a symbol of religious devotion. 
At most, the veil could be considered a symbol of chastity. But 
chastity to gender inequality is a stretch.  
We further analyzed our interviews from a gender 
perspective. There was a wide variety of views on gender 
relations ranging from very conservative to quite progressive. For 
example, one woman expressed her view in this manner, “I do 
not want to be equal to a man, I want to remain a woman, I don’t 
want to do the work of a woman and a mother and do the work of 
a man on top of that.”119 
Yet, other women saw things differently, as illustrated 
by the following quotes: 
I went to Egypt and met women with a burqa who 
were lawyers, doctors. I also want to be like that, 
to achieve something more. I can study, I can 
work, I can do the same things as any other 
woman or man.120 
. . . 
At my house, we are two to vacuum, two to 
prepare meals, two to bathe the children, two to 
change the diapers, two to do the shopping, two to 
babysit.121 
A large majority of our interviewees were housewives. For 
some women, the life of a housewife is the expression of a 
commitment to traditional gender roles. Yet, there are others for 
whom the life of a housewife is not their first choice; they dream 
of a society in which they would not have to choose between a 
                                                          
119 Id. at nr. 5. 
120 Focus group discussion with Belgian niqabis, supra note 96. 
121 Id. 
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career and a face veil. Some women who wear a face veil express 
assertive emancipated views against traditional role patterns and 
against unequal gender practices in the Muslim community. 
Clearly, the face veil is not an indicator of its wearer’s approval 
of male dominance, let alone of its promotion. With such a gap 
between insider and outsider interpretations, it appears that the 
face veil is not truly a symbol at all. Instead, for some, it is an 
excuse to engage in textbook prejudice and stigmatization. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
From the perspective of the women concerned, bans on face 
veils are counterproductive with respect to all three of the stated 
purposes for the ban: (1) they restrict women’s rights instead of 
furthering them; (2) they reduce social interaction; and (3) they 
expose women to serious safety risks. The French and Belgian 
legislators were not concerned with the impact on face veil 
wearing women, but rather with the effect on people who are 
confronted with women wearing the face veil. People for whom 
the sight of a face veil is an affront to women’s dignity, who do 
not want to interact with a woman wearing a face veil in shops or 
on the street, and who feel unsafe when they come across a face 
veil because they associate it with terrorism and fundamentalist 
Islam—it is those people whom the ban seeks to protect. 
Will the S.A.S. v. France judgment force European states to 
withdraw their face veil bans? If the European Court of Human 
Rights takes empirical reality seriously, it cannot uphold the bans. 
Yet the risk remains that the European Court of Human Rights 
cannot bring itself to look through the eyes of such a very 
different Other, and that it will simply accept the French state’s 
justifications based on widely shared assumptions and majority 
concerns—much like the French Constitutional Council and the 
Belgian Constitutional Court already have done.  
 
